InternetNZ will begin a DNSSEC Key Signing Key rollover in our current
standby chain.
This should not affect the active chain used in DNS resolution for .nz.
The status and scheduling will be posted to status.internetnz.nz.
This will consist of three maintenance windows. In each window, we
will pause zone distribution to make changes, perform validation,
and resume zone distribution for the following zones:
nz, ac.nz, co.nz, cri.nz, geek.nz, gen.nz, govt.nz, health.nz, iwi.nz,
kiwi.nz, maori.nz, mil.nz, net.nz, org.nz, parliament.nz, and school.nz
The first maintenance window will be:
https://status.internetnz.nz/incidents/668s3pjy9zpv
For questions or issues, please contact registry(a)internetnz.net.nz.
For updates, please subscribe to the IRS Production > Zone
Publish component of status.internetnz.nz
--
Ngā mihi
Felipe Agnelli Barbosa
DNS Specialist
InternetNZ | Ipurangi Aotearoa
We are the home of .nz and we work for an Internet that benefits all of
Aotearoa.
www.internetnz.nz
GPG: 95C1 8BDC EFA7 9CAC 303D 003E A058 2449 D152 8580
Forwarding on behalf of OARC:
⏰ Only a few days left...
What could you be doing this weekend? The Call for Presentations for
OARC45 closes on July 29, 2025 at 23:59 UTC. All DNS-related subjects
and discussion topics are encouraged, now’s the time to submit your
proposal. Don't miss your chance to be part of the agenda in Stockholm.
https://www.dns-oarc.net/oarc45
Hope to see you there!
--
Ngā mihi
Felipe Agnelli Barbosa
DNS Specialist
InternetNZ | Ipurangi Aotearoa
We are the home of .nz and we work for an Internet that benefits all of
Aotearoa.
www.internetnz.nz
GPG: 95C1 8BDC EFA7 9CAC 303D 003E A058 2449 D152 8580
In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within nzl.
Inferred improvements during Jun 2025:
none inferred
Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2025:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
9500 VODAFONE-TRANSIT 2025-03-19 2025-06-19
Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nzl&no_block=1
Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org
