On 03/02/2011 10:30 AM, Cameron Kerr wrote: Hi Cameron,
Hi everyone, I'm just updating my lecture on exteriour routing for this year, and am wanting to know more about the current state of unfiltered BGP, whereby a customer can advertise a prefix they don't have, their service provider didn't suitably filter the advertisement, and it disrupts other networks in the internet.
I can't find a proper reference, but I think I saw a paper checking on that, or an ongoing experiment testing for that. You might find useful information from the discussions at NANOG around the following events: - The BGP hijack from China - The RIPE/Duke experiment Also worth to take a look at the BGP Beacon experiment (http://www.psg.com/~zmao/BGPBeacon.html) and the Renesys Blog (www.renesys.com/blog).
From NANOG meetings I found a presentation about BGP filtering, but it's outdated.
http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog35/abstracts.php?pt=NDU5Jm5hbm9nMzU=&nm=nanog35
My previous impression, based on discussions around incidents such as the YouTube/Pakistan incident, lead to me believe "Most people don't filter", and I'm just wanting to see if that is [still] the case now.
(Also, thanks to Andy for the NRO nudge)
Cheers, Cameron
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