Hey did anyone else get one of these MP3 players My version of the manual has no page 9 and 2 page 10's incl 2 covers ?? Also, how do ya get it to be recognised in WinXP? Kind Regards, Dan Clark Network Manager Scarfies.Net Ltd
n Mon, 2003-08-11 at 18:17, Dan Clark wrote:
Hey did anyone else get one of these MP3 players My version of the manual has no page 9 and 2 page 10's incl 2 covers ?? Also, how do ya get it to be recognised in WinXP?
There is a bit of a trick to it. You need to make sure hold is off, then turn it on and press the play button. If anyone is trying to use it on FreeBSD, I have a kernel patch to make it work (also posted to -current). Andy
For those who have not read /. Yet http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?date=2003-08-11 For those who cant read the link Here is a cut and paste This RPC DCOM worm started spreading early afternoon EDT (evening UTC). At this point, it is spreading rapidly. ********** NOTE: PRELIMINARY. Do not base your incidents response solely on this writeup. ********** Increase in port 135 activity: http://isc.sans.org/images/port135percent.png Latest update: The worm may launch a syn flood against windowsupdate.com on the 16th. (unconfirmed) The worm uses the RPC DCOM vulnerability to propagate. One it finds a vulnerable system, it will spawn a shell on port 4444 and use it to download the actual worm via tftp. The exploit itself is very close to 'dcom.c' and so far appears to use the "universal Win2k" offset only. The name of the binary is msblast.exe. It is packed with UPX and will self extract. The size of the binary is about 11kByte unpacked, and 6kBytes packed: MD5sum packed: 5ae700c1dffb00cef492844a4db6cd69 (6176 Bytes) So far we found the following properties: - Scans sequentially for machines with open port 135, starting at a presumably random IP address - uses multiple TFTP servers to pull the binary - adds a registry key to start itself after reboot Name of registry key: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, name: 'windows auto update' Strings of interest: msblast.exe I just want to say LOVE YOU SAN!! billy gates why do you make this possible ? Stop making money and fix your software!! windowsupdate.com start %s tftp -i %s GET %s %d.%d.%d.%d %i.%i.%i.%i BILLY windows auto update SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Existing RPC DCOM snort signatures will detect this worm. The worm is based on dcom.c known tftp servers for this worm: 204.210.57.87 217.211.179.193 24.147.64.171 24.147.64.205 24.147.64.208 24.147.65.146 24.147.65.45 24.147.65.9 61.254.65.159 67.119.36.219 68.112.65.38 68.166.102.136 68.166.107.21 68.166.111.175 68.166.120.34 68.166.121.135 68.166.123.4 68.166.124.186 68.166.124.93 68.166.139.155 68.166.139.210 68.166.141.66 68.166.142.194 68.166.142.215 68.166.36.178 68.166.56.123 68.166.60.51 68.166.98.3
For those who have not read /. Yet http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?date=2003-08-11
For those who cant read the link Here is a cut and paste
This RPC DCOM worm started spreading early afternoon EDT (evening UTC). At
When I heard about this virus yesterday morning, I was thinking...
Couldn't you forward the tftp server ip addresses to a server on your
network (for a big ISP) and replace the file that the virus is trying to
download with a fix to it, thus patching the user instead of effecting them?
Barry
----- Original Message -----
From: "Kevin Stewart"
********** NOTE: PRELIMINARY. Do not base your incidents response solely on this
writeup. **********
Increase in port 135 activity:
http://isc.sans.org/images/port135percent.png
Latest update: The worm may launch a syn flood against windowsupdate.com
on the 16th. (unconfirmed)
The worm uses the RPC DCOM vulnerability to propagate. One it finds a
use it to download the actual worm via tftp. The exploit itself is very close to 'dcom.c' and so far appears to use the "universal Win2k" offset only.
The name of the binary is msblast.exe. It is packed with UPX and will self extract. The size of the binary is about 11kByte unpacked, and 6kBytes packed:
MD5sum packed: 5ae700c1dffb00cef492844a4db6cd69 (6176 Bytes)
So far we found the following properties:
- Scans sequentially for machines with open port 135, starting at a
- uses multiple TFTP servers to pull the binary - adds a registry key to start itself after reboot
Name of registry key: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, name: 'windows auto update'
Strings of interest:
msblast.exe I just want to say LOVE YOU SAN!! billy gates why do you make this possible ? Stop making money and fix your software!! windowsupdate.com start %s tftp -i %s GET %s %d.%d.%d.%d %i.%i.%i.%i BILLY windows auto update SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Existing RPC DCOM snort signatures will detect this worm. The worm is
vulnerable system, it will spawn a shell on port 4444 and presumably random IP address based on dcom.c
known tftp servers for this worm:
204.210.57.87 217.211.179.193 24.147.64.171 24.147.64.205 24.147.64.208 24.147.65.146 24.147.65.45 24.147.65.9 61.254.65.159 67.119.36.219 68.112.65.38 68.166.102.136 68.166.107.21 68.166.111.175 68.166.120.34 68.166.121.135 68.166.123.4 68.166.124.186 68.166.124.93 68.166.139.155 68.166.139.210 68.166.141.66 68.166.142.194 68.166.142.215 68.166.36.178 68.166.56.123 68.166.60.51 68.166.98.3
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2003 at 07:07:59PM +1200, Barry Murphy wrote:
When I heard about this virus yesterday morning, I was thinking...
Couldn't you forward the tftp server ip addresses to a server on your network (for a big ISP) and replace the file that the virus is trying to download with a fix to it, thus patching the user instead of effecting them?
I'd like it if it could also fix up all those open proxies that spammers use. I'd bet that anyone with lax administration that has one problem also has the other. Regards, RH. -- Friends don't let friends do Windows(tm).
On Wed, 2003-08-13 at 19:07, Barry Murphy wrote:
When I heard about this virus yesterday morning, I was thinking...
Couldn't you forward the tftp server ip addresses to a server on your network (for a big ISP) and replace the file that the virus is trying to download with a fix to it, thus patching the user instead of effecting them?
Good try but no cigar! The worm actually get's its body from the machine that infected it, not from a fixed server. The worm got into our network (I'm guessing it came in on someone's laptop that got infected at home) and spread to a large number of machines with *no* tftp session off campus. We have long blocked tftp at the boarder. -- Russell Fulton, Network Security Officer, The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
participants (6)
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Andrew Thompson
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Barry Murphy
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Dan Clark
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Kevin Stewart
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richard@kcbbs.gen.nz
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Russell Fulton