- NZNOG - lists.nznog.org

Another virtual NOG meeting on Wednesday
by Mark Prior 26 Oct '20

26 Oct '20

This time it's the Mongolian NOG having a half day virtual NOG meeting via Zoom. Times are UTC+8:00. <https://nog.mn/en/schedule/> Mark.

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Cold Calling on a public holiday
by Craig Whitmore 25 Oct '20

25 Oct '20

I've had 2 calls today from a USA number (At 7:40am and 12:30 pm ) trying to sell me BGP network monitoring software. I think they may be calling ISP NOC's from the NOC list (Not a recent copy) . Searching for the number they called from it seems they have been complaints of them doing it in the past. Sent from my iPhone

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IANA AS Numbers Registry Update
by Selina Harrington 20 Oct '20

20 Oct '20

Hi, The IANA AS Numbers registry has been updated to reflect the allocation of the following blocks to APNIC: 141626-142649 Assigned by APNIC 2020-10-20 142650-143673 Assigned by APNIC 2020-10-20 You can find the registry at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/ The allocation was made in accordance with the Policy for Allocation of ASN Blocks to Regional Internet Registries: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/global-policy-asn-blocks-2010-09-21-en Best Regards, -- Selina Harrington Lead IANA Services Specialist

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YEEE!
by sickjoke＠nasa-g0v.com 19 Oct '20

19 Oct '20

YEEE! Kind Regards Antony.

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NZNOG 2021 - Delay
by Richard Nelson 14 Oct '20

14 Oct '20

The NZNOG Trust has unfortunately had to postpone and potentially cancel the NZNOG Conference that under normal conditions would be held at the end of January 2021. Although the latest CoVID outbreaks appear to be over and we are all back to level 1, there are still some big uncertainties that make the event too risky. - Another outbreak is still possible that may result in travel and group limitations. Although we could schedule the meeting somewhere less likely to have an outbreak than Auckland we are reliant on Aucklanders attending so that would not help. - NZNOG is quite dependent on international input for both Sponsorship and Speakers. At present it is not possible to get overseas speakers in to the country, which traditionally is more than 50% of our program. Sponsors are also doubtful, and that is more than 50% of our income for the conference. We are still working on options to hold an NZNOG Conference in 2021. Later this year or early next we will consider an event around May/June 2021. Another option may be mini events for all or part of a day for smaller numbers of people. We are not considering a virtual event as there doesn't seem to be anything we can offer different to APNIC or other virtual event hosts. Richard Nelson for NZNOG Trust

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Spoofer Report for NZNOG for Sep 2020
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Oct '20

08 Oct '20

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nzl. Inferred improvements during Sep 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 45671 AS45671-NET-AU 2020-08-18 2020-09-03 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nzl&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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Spoofer Report for NZNOG for Aug 2020
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Sep '20

08 Sep '20

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nzl. Inferred improvements during Aug 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 136557 HOST 2020-08-25 2020-08-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nzl&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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AS0 RPKI system deployed in production (Prop132)
by Elly Tawhai 02 Sep '20

02 Sep '20

________________________________________________________________________ AS0 RPKI system deployed in production (Prop132) ________________________________________________________________________ Hi NZNOG Community, The AS0 RPKI system previously in test has now been deployed to production. This completes implementation of APNIC Policy Prop132 "RPKI ROAs for unallocated and unassigned APNIC address space" https://www.apnic.net/community/policy/proposals/prop-132 A new TAL is being used which can be fetched from: https://tal.apnic.net/apnic-as0.tal Alternate forms of this TAL are also available and are documented at: https://www.apnic.net/community/security/resource-certification/tal-archive/ Please replace any prior TAL configuration in your RPKI validation systems. If you are not using this TAL consider adding it to get notification of authenticated denial of unallocated resources in the APNIC region. A report on deployment will be presented at APNIC50. This service will be discussed in the APNIC Routing SIG at the meeting, and subsequently on the mailing list: https://www.apnic.net/community/participate/sigs/routing-sig/ A blog article describing the deployment methodology is available at: https://blog.apnic.net/2020/09/02/policy-prop-132-as0-for-unallocated-space… Caveats and warnings about the use of this AS0 ROA are documented at: https://www.apnic.net/community/security/resource-certification/apnic-limit… ________________________________________________________________________ APNIC Secretariat secretariat(a)apnic.net Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC) Tel: +61 7 3858 3100 PO Box 3646 South Brisbane, QLD 4101 Australia Fax: +61 7 3858 3199 6 Cordelia Street, South Brisbane, QLD http://www.apnic.net ________________________________________________________________________

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mta.actrix.co.nz
by Matt Mariu 26 Aug '20

26 Aug '20

Howdy Chaps Anyone on the list who manages mail MTA's @ Actrix (Voyager) - can you contact me off list ? Thanks Matt @ Healthscope IMPORTANT - HEALTHSCOPE NZ is a division of the Healthscope Group of companies. This email contains confidential information intended only for the person named above and may be subject to legal privilege. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying or use of this information is prohibited. Healthscope provides no guarantee that this communication is free of virus or that it has not been intercepted or interfered with. If you have received this email in error or have any other concerns regarding its transmission, please notify the sender. You must destroy the original transmission and its contents. Any views expressed within this communication are those of the individual sender, except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Healthscope. If this document is not required for record keeping purposes please consider the environment before storing or printing. This communication should not be copied or disseminated without permission. Please consider the environment before printing this Message.

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Spoofer Report for NZNOG for Jul 2020
by CAIDA Spoofer Project 08 Aug '20

08 Aug '20

In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within nzl. Inferred improvements during Jul 2020: none inferred Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2020: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 9790 VOCUSGROUPNZ 2016-08-15 2020-07-23 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=nzl&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info(a)caida.org

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